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Environmental Participation and Environmental Motivation 
 
Summary 
We explore whether environmental motivation affects environmental behavior by 
focusing on volunteering. The paper first introduces a theoretical model of volunteering 
in environmental organizations. In a next step, it tests the hypothesis working with a 
large micro data set covering 32 countries from both Western and Eastern Europe using 
several different proxies to measure environmental motivation. Our results indicate that 
environmental motivation has a strong impact on individuals’ voluntary engagement in 
environmental organizations. A higher level of environmental motivation due to higher 
environmental moral standards may lead to a stronger voluntary involvement in 
environmental organizations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Why is it that a growing number of studies are devoted to examining individual 
environmental preferences, proposing for example, that individuals’ environmental 
morale or attitudes could help to reduce environmental degradation or the problems of 
free riding associated with public goods (see, for example Frey and Stutzer, 2006)?  One 
motivation for such a suggestion is that control and deterrence models predict a level of 
compliance far lower than that actually observed. In many countries, the level of 
government control is too low to explain the high degree of environmental compliance. 
For example, it is common practice for the majority of park visitors to carefully collect 
and wrap their refuse before purposely driving to the bin and disposing of it. This action 
incurs a personal cost that could have been avoided by simply leaving the rubbish behind, 
considering there is no threat of omnipresent police officers. In an attempt to resolve this 
puzzle of compliance, researchers have identified social norms and the strength of these 
norms as an explanation for the high degree of compliance. Similarly, a high level of co-
operation can also be found in experiments. According to Ochs and Roth (1989) and Roth 
(1995), many ultimatum experiments have shown that the modal offer is (50,50), that the 
mean offer is somewhere around (40,60), and that the smaller the offer, the higher the 
probability that the offer will be rejected. Moreover, according to Ledyard (1995) and 
Davis and Holt (1993), public good experiments indicate that, on average, subjects 
contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment to a public good. Baldry (1987) 
identifies a need to revise the theory rather than questioning the experimental method. 
However, there are few studies exploring empirically whether such pro-environmental   3
attitudes exert a positive effect on either environmental behavior or involvement in 
environmental organizations. The presence of such norms or environmental motivation 
influencing the willingness to contribute to the environment is especially useful in 
situations where it is extraordinarily expensive to arrange a regulatory enforcement 
regime. A desirable and positive side effect of voluntary compliance is that it lowers the 
cost of government operations aimed at ensuring public good provision (Slemrod 2002).   
Recent studies in the area of ecological economics have shown that social capital 
indeed influences transaction costs and also the effectiveness of public environmental 
policies (see Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007). These results suggest that 
“environmental conflicts can be resolved by making collective choices that are 
implemented by establishing, changing or reaffirming governance institutions” (Paavola 
and Adger, 2005, p. 364). It has furthermore been shown that the existence of social 
capital is important when dealing with new environmental scenarios, such as the threat of 
climate change, or for coping with the impact of environmental disasters, such as 
droughts or floods. The adaptive capability of societies is strongly linked to their ability 
to act collectively (Adger, 2003).  
The strength of this paper lies to explore the impact of environmental motivation 
on environmental behavior focusing on individuals’ voluntary engagement in 
environmental organization and to test its impact with the use of a large micro data set 
covering 32 European countries. Such breadth and depth of data allows for exploration of 
the different channels through which individuals express their environment motivation 
through pro-environmental attitudes, and we capitalize on this opportunity by exploring   4
two variables that measure voluntary environmental participation (i.e. membership and 
voluntary work).  
Section 2 of the paper first discusses the theoretical background and introduces a 
model of volunteering. Section 3 introduces the data set and the key variables.  The 
empirical findings are presented in Section 4 and some concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 5. 
 
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Civil engagement in voluntary organizations is gaining increased attention from 
researchers; nonetheless the causes of environmental participation are still relatively 
unknown.  The benefit of participation in voluntary activities is the creation of social 
output that would per se require paid resources (Freeman, 1997). Pretty and Ward (2001) 
showed that the creation of active pro-environmental groups was significant for solving 
certain local environmental problems
1. Our study will not only explore the gender, age 
and parental effect, but will also show who is likely to participate and whose priorities 
and values are best promoted by voluntary work in environmental organizations. 
However, to date only a few studies have analyzed the factors impacting on the 
participation in environmental organizations (Mohai, 1992; Thompson and Barton, 1994; 
Martinez and McMullin, 2004). The advantage of focusing on direct participation in 
environmental organizations is that individuals’ behavior can be measured.  Moreover, it 
                                                 
1 Those authors analyzed some environmental organizations in rural communities. They found an evolution 
from reactive-dependence groups (static and created exclusively in reaction to a threat or a crisis), towards 
awareness-interdependence groups (more dynamic and interactive).    5
builds a bridge between the social capital literature that focuses on volunteering and the 
environmental literature on pro-environmental preferences.  
  The relevance of going beyond a neoclassical approach to understanding the 
reasons why citizens comply is demonstrated in the tax compliance literature and the 
analyses of tax paying behavior. Deterrence mechanisms alone cannot explain the level 
of observed compliance in this regard, (Torgler 2007). Similarly, the level of formal 
deterrence is too low to explain why, for example, people do not litter more often. Social 
norms help to resolve such a puzzle, but more empirical evidence is required to determine 
whether environmental attitudes affect environmental actions, although previous 
literature has shown that values and attitudes can affect individual behavior (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1980; Lewis, 1982).  Thus, it is useful to explore whether the decision to 
participate in environmental organizations is driven by a set of attitudes and norms. Our 
theoretical model is strongly influenced by previous studies on altruism (Andreoni, 1990) 
and moral motivation in a public good environment (Brekke et al. 2003).  
  A set of social norms that place a higher value on the environment increases the 
moral costs of not making a significant contribution to environmental quality. This may 
influence the decision to become active in an environmental organization. It is therefore a 
relevant issue to investigate whether differences in environmental attitudes across 
individuals and countries are reflected in any differences in real or observed behaviors.  
Prevailing social norms thus tend to generate increased individual cooperation in public 
good situations and, in some instances, of private goods as well. Violation of social 
norms has negative consequences, such as internal sanctions (e.g. guilt, remorse) or 
external legal and social sanctions, such as gossip and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavell   6
(2000) point out, the corresponding literature focuses on the influence that social norms 
have on individual behavior, and their role as a substitute for, or a supplement to, formal 
laws. 
  What is the meaning of ‘pro-environmental behavior’? Kollmuss and Agyeman 
(2002) define it as actions taken by an individual in consciously seeking to minimize the 
negative impact of human activities on the environment and Jensen (2002) refers to those 
personal actions that are directly related to environmental improvements. Some daily 
activities, such as minimizing resource and energy consumption, reducing and recycling 
waste, or using public transport are private actions which contribute to the preservation of 
nature.  In the same way, participation in environmental organizations can be seen as a 
kind of pro-environmental behavior and is highly relevant in ensuring the efficacy of 
environmental policies which require behavioral changes. When considered from an 
economic perspective, this behavior “exemplifies an individual’s voluntary effort to 
provide an environmental public good” (Clark et al. 2003,  p. 238). Why do people take 
actions which result in collective benefits? While the traditional theoretical models 
predict a free-rider effect in the private provision of public goods, in practice the 
observed levels of provision are higher than anticipated (Andreoni, 1988; Piliavin and 
Charng, 1990). Andreoni (1990, p. 465) provides an important model of impure altruism 
to understand donations to public goods. He assumes an economy with only one private 
good and one public good. The individual utility donation function depends on the 
consumption of a private good (xi), the total amount of a public good (G), and the 
individual’s gift to the public good (gi). Thus, Ui = U(xi, G, gi). This allows to 
differentiate two cases, namely a purely altruistic situation U(xi, Gi) when the individual   7
cares nothing for the private gift, and U(xi, gi) when the individual is motivated to give 
only by warm-glow (purely egoistic). The cases in between are defined as an impurely 
altruistic behavior. However, he acknowledges that there are important alternative 
approaches to such an impure altruism model, namely moral or group-interested 
behavior. In line with such a suggestion, Brekke et al. (2003) implement moral 
motivation in their model by working with a social welfare function to determine the 
morally ideal effort, where individuals share a utilitarian moral philosophy. For 
simplicity, they assume that the labor supply and the income are exogenously fixed. In a 
next step, individuals maximize their utility in a benefit-cost environment, trading the 
benefits of maintaining a self-image as socially responsible individuals against the costs. 
Improving the self-image induces an effort improvement towards beliefs that are 
perceived to be morally right.  
  We now introduce our model. We assume that individual’s utility function is 
given by 
 
 ) , , , ( i i i i G l x U U λ =      (1) 
 
where  i x  is individual i’s consumption of private goods,  i l  leisure, G is the public good 
of increasing environmental quality, and  i λ  the utility from participating voluntarily in 
an environmental organization. 
  Voluntary work is time consuming and subject to opportunity costs. Thus,  i v  
represent the hours spent for voluntary work in an environmental organization. 
Individuals’ consumption can therefore be written as an income constraint, defined by the   8
product of the wage rate w and the working hours T -  i l  -  i v   0 ≥ , where T is the time 
constraint (available time):  
 
 ) ( i i i i v l T w x − − =      (2) 
 
The total amount of public good (environmental quality) depends on the public provision 
Gp and private provision ∑i i g , assuming identical individuals N: 
 
  G =  p G +  ∑i i g      (3) 
where 
  i g =  i v α      (4) 
is individual i’s production function that depends on the level of voluntary participation 
in an environmental organization and an efficiency parameterα . Since we have identical 
individuals ∑i i g  is equal to  i Ng . Therefore, we can write: 
 
  G =  p G + N i v α      (5) 
 
The utility from participating in a voluntary environmental organization ( i λ )  has the 
following form: 




v      (6)   9
where  i m is a factor that measures an individual’s motivation to contribute to the 
environment ( i m   ≥   0). It measures what the individual believes to be the morally 
minimum environmental involvement. It should be noted that  i λ  can also become 
negative if the individual is not able to reach this morally minimum level ( i m  >  i v ). This 
would induce a feeling of guilt and shame rather than a psychic gain when  i v  > m i. 
  We also assume that the utility function is additively separable in  , , , G l x i i  and 
i λ . The utility function thus becomes: 
 
  i i i i G l x U λ + + + =      (7) 
 
Considering (2) to (6) leads to the following utility function: 
 
  ) ln( )   ( ) (
i
i
i p i i i i i m
v
v N G l v l T w U + + + + − − = α      (8) 
 
An individual maximizes utility (8) subject to her voluntary involvement in an 









'  equal to 0 
leads to the following condition for the optimal effort engagement: 
 







=     (9) 
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Eq. (9) suggests that environmental participation will increase with an increase in 
individual’s perceived morally minimum environmental involvement. Thus, we can 
develop the following main hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  A higher level of environmental motivation due to higher environmental 
moral standards leads to a stronger voluntary involvement in 
environmental organizations.  
 
Moreover, Eq. (9) also indicates that an increase in the wage rate changes the allocation 
of time. An increase leads to a decline of voluntary work in environmental organizations. 
However, such a negative effect is reduced with a higher level of efficiency in the 
contribution of the private provision of the public good, α  multiplied by the number of 
individuals in the society. It should be noted that we have implemented a consumer 
model. One may argue that individuals are also volunteering to accumulate human capital 
with the intention of increasing future income through the acquisition of certain types of 
skills and through creating and developing networks that enhance their human capital 
(Hackl et al., 2007). This would require the use of an investment model with a dynamic 
structure. However, we believe that our consumer model is very useful when exploring 
moral values. 
 
III. DATA  
We use two variables that measure involvement in a voluntary environmental 
organization, namely membership and doing unpaid work:   11
 
  Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities 
and say which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for: 
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights (1=yes, 0 otherwise).  
  
 Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities 
and say which, if any, do you belong: conservation, the environment, ecology, 
animal rights (1=mentioned, 0= not mentioned). 
 
To ensure the robustness of results, we use several dependent variables that can be seen 
as a proxy m, namely the motivation to contribute to the environment. The first two 
variables measure m in the following way: 
 
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
Although we are not conducting a contingent valuation study (CV), these two questions 
offer the chance to explore our parameter m. However, the question is not free of 
problems and can be criticized in several ways. The statement is relatively vague: 
“environmental pollution” is not clearly specified, and neither is the level of   12
improvement. Similarly, the degree of income to be spent and the tax increase are not 
clarified. Therefore the respondents are not aware of how much they would 
hypothetically have to contribute
2. The consequences of taxation are not mentioned and 
no information is provided regarding the extent to which income tax, value added tax or 
other taxes are supposed to increase. Thus, it is not clear who will bear the highest tax 
burden. Such unspecified payment schemes questions will increase the variance in 
responses, but on the other hand, may influence the willingness to contribute (Witzke and 
Urfei, 2001). Nevertheless, despite these possible shortcomings, an unspecified statement 
still helps to measure moral values and to reduce strategic behavior via influencing the 
quantity or quality of environmental goods. A more concrete scenario could encourage 
respondents to intentionally indicate false willingness to contribute values in order to 
match their own preferences (Hidano et al., 2005). When neither specific goods nor 
quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in question do not 
have to be thoroughly explained to be sure that respondents understand and respond with 
the appropriate willingness to spend income and accept an increase in taxes
3.  
  In a next step we will explore a variable that measures environmental attitudes, 
but takes into account the possibility that people may have an incentive to free-ride 
(profit without incurring costs). We would predict that such a variable would lead to 
contradictory results (compared to the previous two variables): 
 
                                                 
2 It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regarding causes and consequences of 
environmental damages) depend on the level of information included in the questionnaire (Bulte et al., 
2005). 
3 For a detailed discussion regarding possible survey biases see Carson and Mitchell (1995).   13
The Government has to reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost me 
any money (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables, which are explained in 
the Appendix. Previous research in environmental economics and social norms 
demonstrates the relevance of considering such socio-demographic factors, formal and 
informal education and participation in an environmental organization (see Torgler and 
Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007).  We also differentiate between the two regions of 
Europe (i.e. Western and Eastern Europe) to account for effects of the reform process in 
the transition countries. The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern European 
countries produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of these countries. This led to large 
social costs, especially in terms of worsening income inequalities, increasing poverty and 
poor institutional conditions resulting from uncertainty and high transaction costs. 
Torgler (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) show that such circumstances have an impact on 
social norms.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This paper uses survey data provided by the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000, 
which is a European-wide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. The survey 
collects data on the basic values and beliefs of people throughout Europe. The EVS was 
first carried out from 1981 to 1983, then in 1990 to 1991 and again in 1999 through 2001, 
with an increasing number of countries participating over time. The methodological   14
approach is explained in detail in the European Values Survey (1999) source book, which 
provides information on response rates, the stages of sampling procedures, the translation 
of the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures of coding consistency, 
reliability of data, and data checks. All country surveys are conducted by experienced 
professional survey organizations, with the exception of Greece. Interviews are face-to-
face and those interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Tilburg University 
coordinates the project and provides the guidelines to guarantee the use of standardized 
information in the surveys and the national representativeness of the data. To avoid 
framing biases, the questions are asked in a prescribed order. The response rates vary 
from country to country with an average response rate of around 60 percent.  
Because EVS poses an identical set of questions to individuals in various 
European countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to empirically examine our 
hypotheses. We are able to employ a large data set considering 32 representative national 
samples. EVS has been designed as a wide-ranging survey, thereby reducing the danger 
of framing effects when compared with many other surveys that focus entirely on 
environmental questions. A further advantage of using this extensive data set is the ability 
to explore a large number of dependent variables.  
Economists are increasingly using survey data in such areas of research as those 
dealing with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance. These literatures 
explore the causes of attitudes (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Brewer and 
Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and 
Torgler, 2008).   15
   In general, a probit estimation is appropriate when working with information such 
as our two dependent variables measuring participation in environmental organizations. 
We calculate the marginal effects to measure the quantitative effect of a variable, because 
the equation is nonlinear. Marginal effects indicate the change in the probability of 
individuals having a specific level of environmental preferences when the independent 
variable increases by one unit. Weighted estimates are conducted to make the samples 
correspond to the national distribution.
4 Furthermore, answers such as ‘don’t know’ and 
missing values are eliminated in all estimations. 
Table 1 presents the findings regarding being a member in an environmental 
organization. In the first three specifications we explore our key environmental 
motivation variables m separately and the fourth includes all the three variables in the 
specification. The results from the first three specifications indicate that all the m proxies 
are statistically significant. The first two have a positive impact, and the third has a 
negative impact. Thus, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. A higher level of environmental 
motivation due to higher moral standards induces voluntary involvement in 
environmental organizations. The negative coefficient in specification (3) is consistent 
with our prediction as it measures individuals’ interest in free-riding. A higher 
willingness to free-ride is negatively correlated with environmental engagement. The 
variable WILLINGESS TO GIVE INCOME has the strongest effect. An increase in the 
scale by one unit raises the probability of participating in an environmental organization 
by 2.5 percentage points.  The importance of this variable is also visible once you include 
all three variables in the regression. The coefficient is still statistically significant at the 
1% level with a marginal effect of 1.9 percentage points. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
4 The weighting variable is provided by the EVS.    16
coefficient for the variable WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES is only statistically 
significant at the 10% level, and also shows a decrease in the marginal effects. Overall, 
these first results indicate that environmental motivation matters.  
Looking at the control variables we can see that women are more likely to be 
members of environmental organizations. Age is also positively correlated with being a 
member. Overall, the age group AGE 50-59 shows the strongest level of environmental 
participation (largest marginal effects). Having a child is negatively correlated with 
environmental participation, as time restrictions may act as a barrier to being involved in 
environmental organizations. Education and political interest, measured as political 
discussion, have a positive impact on the probability of being a member in an 
environmental organization. The time restriction argument may also be invoked when 
focusing on the marital status. Those who have never before been married, as well as 
those who are separated have the highest probability of participating in environmental 
organizations. Moreover, when taking into account the employment status, we observe 
part time employees are more likely to be members. There is also the tendency for self-
employed individuals to be more active in environmental organizations, probably because 
of the chance to improve their networks. On the other hand, the time restriction argument 
fails when it comes to the unemployed and retired, as they are less likely to be members 
than full-time employees. Finally, we also observe that people in Western Europe are 
more engaged in environmental organizations through membership participation. The 
marginal effects are quite large (more than 4 percentage points).  
 In  Table 2 we explore a second aspect, namely doing unpaid work for 
environmental organizations. The results are quite similar. All the proxies for m in   17
specification (5) to (7) are statistically significant. The strongest effects are again 
observable for the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME.  However, it should be 
noted that compared to Table 1 we find lower quantitative effects. Specification (8) also 
shows that the coefficient for the variable CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS is not 
anymore statistically significant.   
  Looking at the control variables we find that compared to previously there is a 
negative correlation between environmental participation and being a woman. Thus, 
women are more likely to be a member in an environmental organization, but are less 
likely to do unpaid work. However, it can be argued that women might be more active in 
community-based and neighborhood organizations which address local environmental 
issues, while men are more likely to participate in formal environmental organizations. 
Our survey question captures more of the latter than the former – for this reason, our 
results may not be in great conflict with findings to the contrary. Moreover, it should be 
noted that women (particularly younger women) have higher restrictions on participation 
in voluntary organizations, as they are often more heavily involved in time intensive 
household activities. 
  The age effect is now less visible, but we still observe that the AGE group 50-59 
has the strongest probability of doing unpaid work. Also, the parental effect is now less 
obvious. On the other hand education and political interest have a significant and positive 
impact on environmental engagement. Moreover, we also observe that the “never 
married” individuals are the most active in environmental organizations. On the other 
hand, only retired people are significantly less willing than the full time-employed 
individuals to be active in environmental organizations through unpaid work. Finally we   18
also observe that Western European citizens are more likely to be environmentally 
engaged. However, the effect is less strong than previously and the coefficient is no 
longer statistically significant in all specifications.  
  In the next two tables we extend the previous regression by including individuals’ 
economic situation with two dummy variables. It should be noted that the number of 
observations in Table 3 and 4 strongly decreased after controlling for individuals’ 
economic situation. The results indicate that a higher level of economic status leads to a 
higher probability of being a member and doing unpaid work in environmental 
organizations. It seems that wealthier citizens have a higher demand for a clean 
environment and less environmental damages and thus a stronger incentive to actively 
contribute to the environment by participating in a voluntary organization. Thus, such a 
result is not consistent with our Eq. (9). However, it should be noted that the economic 
situation variable may not only cover the current wage but also the accumulated wealth 
over time. Nevertheless, we observe that the results obtained previously remain robust.  
Table 5 explores the potential endogeneity problems. One can argue that being 
involved in an environmental organization enhances pro-social environmental attitudes. 
To control for such a problem, we will use an instrumental approach to check the 
robustness of the results. A suitable instrument must be contemporaneously uncorrelated 
with the error term but must be highly correlated with membership in a voluntary 
environmental organization. We use an index of perceived level of social non-compliance   19
with well-known social rules
5. For simplicity, we only report the results on membership 
involvement in Table 5. The table reports the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimations together with the first stage regressions. The results indicate that attitudinal 
questions have a strong and significant impact on environmental involvement. In 
addition,  Table 5 also shows that the instruments and the F-tests for the instrument 
exclusion set in the first-stage regression are statistically significant. There is a negative 
correlation between our environmental motivation variables and the perceived level of 
dishonest behavior. We also report the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for the 
relevance of the instruments, checking the relevance of the excluded instruments. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identified and that the 
instruments are relevant (see Hall et al., 1996). Moreover, we show results of the 
Anderson-Rubin test indicating that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically 
significant. Table 5 reports that in all cases the Anderson canonical correlations LR test 
shows rejection of the null hypothesis, which indicates that the models are identified and 
that the instruments are relevant. The Anderson-Rubin test is also statistically significant 
and has the advantage of being robust to the presence of weak instruments. 
  Finally, we test in Table 6 and 7 whether the impact of environmental motivation 
on environmental involvement is driven by a subset of countries and present the results 
for the coefficients for environmental attitudes in both tables using the specifications in 
the first two tables (without controlling for the economic situation). Each table is a 
                                                 
5Aggregated index of the following questions: According to you, how many of your compatriots do the 
following: Claming state benefits to which they are not entitled. Driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Speeding over the limit in built-up areas (each scale from 4=almost all to 1=almost none).  
   20
summary of 96 regressions conducted within 32 countries. Table 6 focuses on 
membership participation, while Table 7 explores unpaid work as a dependent variable. 
In general we observe differences between the countries. Table 6 shows that the 
coefficient of the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME is statistically significant 
in 25 out of 32 cases, and the strongest effect is observed for the Netherlands. An 
increase in the WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME by one unit increases the probability 
of being a member in an environmental organization by almost 10 percentage points. A 
strong quantitative effect is also observed in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Greece, 
however the effects are generally lower among Eastern European countries. We find a 
similar result for the variable WILLIGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES. The coefficient is 
statistically significant in 24 out 32 cases. The strongest effect can also be found in the 
Netherlands (9.1 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.4 percentage points) and 
Greece (3.4 percentage points). The results are less strong when focusing on willingness 
to free-ride. However, here we also observe the strongest negative impact for the 
Netherlands (8.9 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.2 percentage points) and 
Belgium (4.2 percentage points).  Looking at Table 7 and therefore at unpaid work we 
find that the relationship is less strong when using unpaid work instead of membership 
participation as a dependent variable. Thus, environmental motivation helps to 
substantially increase the number of memberships, but is less strong when individuals are 
required to do unpaid work for environmental organizations. The coefficient for the 
variable WILLIGNESS TO GIVE INCOME is now only statistically significant in 18 out 
32 regressions. The quantitative effects are also substantially smaller. Greece reports the   21
strongest effect with a marginal effect of 3.5 percentage points. Moreover, it should be 
noted that the same picture can be found for the other two motivational questions.  
   22
Table 1: Determinants of Being A Member in Environmental Organizations 
   WEIGHTED PROBIT 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  
Environmental Motivation (m)                             
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE 
INCOME 
0.313*** 19.07  0.025                0.250*** 11.97  0.019 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.223*** 14.81 0.019         0.032* 1.70 0.002 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.246*** -17.43 -0.020  -0.177*** -11.79  -0.014 
Gender                      
FEMALE    0.054**  1.97 0.004 0.067** 2.47 0.006 0.059** 2.15 0.005 0.056** 1.99  0.004 
Age                      
AGE  30-39  0.056  1.22 0.004 0.048  1.07 0.004 0.065  1.44 0.005 0.056  1.19  0.004 
AGE  40-49  0.115**  2.38 0.010 0.087*  1.82 0.008 0.110** 2.28 0.010 0.112** 2.25  0.009 
AGE  50-59  0.237***  4.65 0.022 0.216***  4.31 0.021 0.251***  4.93 0.024 0.243***  4.62  0.022 
AGE  60-69  0.189***  2.97 0.017 0.175***  2.77 0.016 0.212***  3.32 0.020 0.198***  3.02  0.018 
AGE  70+  0.238***  3.23 0.022 0.198***  2.68 0.019 0.213***  2.89 0.020 0.227***  2.96  0.021 
Parental Effect                      
CHILD  -0.104* -1.90 -0.008 -0.120** -2.19 -0.009 -0.117** -2.15 -0.009 -0.108*  -1.91  -0.008 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                    
EDUCATION  0.025***  12.02 0.002  0.025*** 12.40 0.002  0.025*** 12.18 0.002  0.022*** 10.24  0.002 
POLITICAL  DISCUSSION  0.142***  7.01 0.011 0.151***  7.53 0.013 0.134***  6.64 0.011 0.114***  5.45  0.009 
Marital Status                     
WIDOWED  -0.103* -1.69 -0.007 -0.159***  -2.60 -0.012 -0.143** -2.37 -0.011 -0.133** -2.08  -0.009 
DIVORCED  -0.062  -1.25 -0.005 -0.065  -1.31 -0.005 -0.072  -1.44 -0.006 -0.062  -1.20  -0.005 
SEPARATED  0.010  0.10 0.001 0.001  0.01 0.000 0.030  0.31 0.002 0.040  0.39  0.003 
NEVER  MARRIED  0.123***  3.24 0.010 0.121***  3.24 0.011 0.135***  3.58 0.012 0.128***  3.29  0.011 
Employment Status                      
PART  TIME  EMPLOYEE  0.141***  3.09 0.012 0.159***  3.54 0.015 0.158***  3.45 0.015 0.151***  3.22  0.013 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.085  1.63 0.007 0.087*  1.67 0.008 0.086  1.63 0.008 0.096*  1.81  0.008 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.099**  -1.97 -0.007 -0.091** -1.82 -0.007 -0.076  -1.51 -0.006 -0.068  -1.32  -0.005   23
AT  HOME  -0.114**  -2.19 -0.008 -0.105** -2.06 -0.008 -0.087*  -1.69 -0.007 -0.094*  -1.76  -0.007 
STUDENT  -0.041  -0.66 -0.003 -0.007  -0.12 -0.001 -0.037  -0.60 -0.003 -0.061  -0.96  -0.005 
RETIRED  -0.252***  -3.96 -0.016 -0.227***  -3.61 -0.016 -0.206***  -3.30 -0.014 -0.219***  -3.37  -0.014 
OTHER  0.138  1.48 0.012 0.170*  1.85 0.016 0.166*  1.80 0.016 0.151  1.59  0.013 
Region                      
WESTERN  EUROPE  0.595***  20.91 0.047  0.554*** 19.90 0.046  0.454  16.38 0.037  0.522*** 17.99  0.040 
Pseudo R2  0.101       0.086       0.093       0.114      
Number of observations  36086       36052       36237       34428      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
   24
 
Table 2: Determinants of Unpaid Work in Environmental Organizations 
   WEIGHTED PROBIT 
   (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                           
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.233*** 10.45  0.009                0.204*** 7.47  0.008 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.162*** 7.89  0.007         0.045* 1.83 0.002 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.091*** -4.83  -0.004  -0.028  -1.39  -0.001 
Gender                      
FEMALE    -0.100***  -2.79 -0.004 -0.085** -2.40 -0.004 -0.092** -2.61 -0.004 -0.094** -2.55  -0.004 
Age                      
AGE  30-39  0.017  0.30 0.001 0.018  0.31 0.001 0.029  0.52 0.001 0.019  0.33  0.001 
AGE  40-49  0.094  1.58 0.004 0.077  1.32 0.003 0.090  1.54 0.004 0.081  1.34  0.003 
AGE  50-59  0.126* 1.96 0.005 0.127** 2.02 0.006 0.141** 2.22 0.006 0.116*  1.77  0.005 
AGE  60-69  0.123  1.51 0.005 0.096  1.18 0.004 0.116  1.42 0.005 0.110  1.30  0.005 
AGE  70+  0.101  0.92 0.004 0.055  0.50 0.002 0.035  0.31 0.001 0.049  0.42  0.002 
Parental Effect                      
CHILD  -0.106  -1.22 -0.004 -0.115  -1.35 -0.004 -0.101  -1.19 -0.004 -0.082  -0.94  -0.003 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                    
EDUCATION  0.019***  7.13 0.001 0.020***  7.40 0.001 0.021***  7.90 0.001 0.019***  6.71  0.001 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
0.110***  3.98 0.004 0.119***  4.37 0.005 0.115***  4.28 0.005 0.099***  3.53  0.004 
Marital Status                      
WIDOWED  -0.023  -0.28 -0.001 -0.062  -0.74 -0.002 -0.060  -0.72 -0.002 -0.049  -0.56  -0.002 
DIVORCED  -0.100  -1.50 -0.004 -0.091  -1.40 -0.003 -0.102  -1.56 -0.004 -0.103  -1.53  -0.004 
SEPARATED  0.160  1.22 0.007 0.148  1.15 0.007 0.161  1.25 0.008 0.181  1.36  0.009 
NEVER  MARRIED 0.139***  2.92 0.006 0.138***  2.95 0.006 0.144***  3.07 0.007 0.144***  2.96  0.006   25
Employment Status                      
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.064  0.99 0.003 0.071  1.13 0.003 0.080  1.28 0.004 0.065  0.99  0.003 
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.036  -0.50 -0.001 -0.028  -0.39 -0.001 -0.041  -0.57 -0.002 -0.034  -0.46  -0.001 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.114  -1.60 -0.004 -0.095  -1.35 -0.004 -0.103  -1.46 -0.004 -0.096  -1.31  -0.004 
AT  HOME  -0.163**  -2.13 -0.006 -0.137*  -1.85 -0.005 -0.140*  -1.88 -0.005 -0.161** -2.07  -0.005 
STUDENT  0.073  1.02 0.003 0.119*  1.69 0.005 0.100  1.43 0.005 0.068  0.94  0.003 
RETIRED  -0.310***  -3.79 -0.009 -0.310***  -3.82 -0.010 -0.317***  -3.90 -0.010 -0.299***  -3.59  -0.009 
OTHER  0.139  1.14 0.006 0.146  1.21 0.007 0.140  1.16 0.007 0.157  1.27  0.007 
Region                         
WESTERN  EUROPE  0.092***  2.69 0.004 0.069** 2.04 0.003 0.024  0.69 0.001 0.069*  1.93  0.003 
Pseudo R2  0.053       0.043       0.037       0.055      
Number of observations  36086       36052       36237       34428      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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Table 3: Income and Membership in Environmental Organizations 
 
   WEIGHTED PROBIT 
   (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                           
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.295*** 12.87  0.023                0.264*** 9.15  0.020 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.196*** 9.44  0.016         0.008 0.31  0.001 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.205*** -10.37  -0.017  -0.141***  -6.77  -0.011 
Gender                     
FEMALE    0.083**  2.02 0.006 0.090** 2.22 0.007 0.084**  2.07 0.007 0.085** 2.03 0.007 
Age                     
AGE  30-39  -0.058  -0.88 -0.004 -0.055  -0.85 -0.004 -0.043  -0.66 -0.003 -0.059  -0.88 -0.004 
AGE  40-49  0.011  0.16 0.001 -0.014  -0.20  -0.001  0.002  0.03 0.000 0.013  0.19 0.001 
AGE  50-59  0.141*  1.93 0.012 0.120*  1.65 0.011 0.154**  2.09 0.014 0.148*  1.95 0.012 
AGE  60-69  0.000  0.00 0.000 0.002  0.02 0.000 0.033  0.37 0.003 0.012  0.13 0.001 
AGE  70+  -0.051  -0.45 -0.004 -0.102  -0.89 -0.008 -0.108  -0.93 -0.008 -0.099  -0.82 -0.007 
Parental Effect                     
CHILD  -0.044  -0.54 -0.003 -0.044  -0.54 -0.004 -0.039  -0.47 -0.003 -0.030  -0.35 -0.002 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                   
EDUCATION  0.026*** 7.54 0.002 0.026***  7.78 0.002 0.027***  7.95 0.002 0.024***  6.79 0.002 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
0.147*** 4.99 0.012 0.155***  5.29 0.013 0.138***  4.70 0.011 0.123***  4.06 0.009 
Economic Situation                     
UPPER  CLASS  0.142*** 2.65 0.012 0.163***  3.06 0.015 0.156***  2.89 0.014 0.125** 2.26 0.010 
MIDDLE  CLASS 0.087**  2.04 0.007 0.092** 2.19 0.008 0.083*  1.95 0.007 0.079*  1.79 0.006 
Marital Status                     
WIDOWED  -0.067  -0.75 -0.005 -0.122  -1.35 -0.009 -0.095  -1.06 -0.007 -0.104  -1.09 -0.007 
DIVORCED  -0.079  -1.06 -0.006 -0.094  -1.27 -0.007 -0.108  -1.43 -0.008 -0.088  -1.14 -0.006   27
SEPARATED  0.015  0.10 0.001 0.016  0.11 0.001 0.050  0.36 0.004 0.048  0.33 0.004 
NEVER  MARRIED  0.001  0.01 0.000 0.002  0.04 0.000 0.017  0.29 0.001 0.013  0.23 0.001 
Employment Status                     
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.088  1.21 0.007 0.108  1.53 0.010 0.093  1.29 0.008 0.091  1.22 0.007 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.059  0.75 0.005 0.055  0.72 0.005 0.063  0.81 0.005 0.074  0.95 0.006 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.029  -0.42 -0.002 -0.027  -0.38 -0.002 -0.017  -0.24 -0.001 -0.013  -0.18 -0.001 
AT  HOME  -0.176**  -2.40 -0.012 -0.158** -2.20 -0.012 -0.146**  -2.01 -0.011 -0.172** -2.27 -0.012 
STUDENT  -0.108  -1.22 -0.008 -0.056  -0.65 -0.004 -0.105  -1.21 -0.008 -0.128  -1.42 -0.009 
RETIRED  -0.041  -0.50 -0.003 -0.028  -0.34 -0.002 -0.022  -0.27 -0.002 -0.036  -0.43 -0.003 
OTHER  0.092  0.64 0.008 0.093  0.65 0.008 0.101  0.71 0.009 0.116  0.79 0.010 
Region                     
WESTERN  EUROPE    0.355*** 8.06 0.026 0.301***  7.02 0.023 0.254***  5.93 0.019 0.334***  7.39 0.023 
Pseudo R2  0.070       0.066       0.070       0.094      
Number of 
observations 
18862       18887       18877       18155      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The 
symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.    28
Table 4: Income and Unpaid Work in Environmental Organizations 
 
   WEIGHTED PROBIT 
   (13) (14)  (15)  (16) 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg.  
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                           
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.231*** 8.06 0.010                0.212*** 5.98  0.009 
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
     0.153*** 5.77  0.007         0.008 0.26  0.0003 
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
          -0.138***  -5.44 -0.006 -0.084***  -3.18 -0.003 
Gender                     
FEMALE    -0.158*** -3.04 -0.007 -0.144***  -2.80 -0.006 -0.145***  -2.80 -0.006 -0.155***  -2.90 -0.006 
Age                     
AGE  30-39  0.011  0.14 0.000 0.009  0.11 0.000 0.027  0.34 0.001 0.015  0.18 0.001 
AGE  40-49  0.006  0.06 0.000 -0.007  -0.08  0.000 0.005  0.06 0.000 0.001  0.01 0.000 
AGE  50-59  0.099  1.09 0.004 0.088  0.99 0.004 0.111  1.23 0.005 0.089  0.95 0.004 
AGE  60-69  0.040  0.36 0.002 0.016  0.15 0.001 0.038  0.34 0.002 0.030  0.26 0.001 
AGE  70+  0.052  0.35 0.002 0.012  0.08 0.001 -0.030  -0.19  -0.001  -0.013  -0.08  -0.001 
Parental Effect                     
CHILD  -0.042  -0.35 -0.002 -0.039  -0.33 -0.002 -0.016  -0.14 -0.001 -0.005  -0.04 0.000 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                   
EDUCATION  0.022*** 5.43 0.001 0.023***  5.62 0.001 0.023***  5.68 0.001 0.021***  4.85 0.001 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
0.064*  1.68 0.003 0.066*  1.78 0.003 0.055  1.48 0.002 0.039  1.01 0.002 
Economic Situation                     
UPPER  CLASS  0.237*** 3.58 0.012 0.254***  3.91 0.014 0.255***  3.83 0.013 0.241***  3.54 0.012 
MIDDLE  CLASS  0.153*** 2.79 0.007 0.156***  2.88 0.007 0.161***  2.93 0.007 0.166***  2.95 0.007 
Marital Status                     
WIDOWED  0.029  0.25 0.001 -0.006  -0.05  0.000 0.011  0.09 0.000 -0.007  -0.06  0.000   29
DIVORCED  -0.077  -0.85 -0.003 -0.085  -0.94 -0.003 -0.106  -1.16 -0.004 -0.095  -1.03 -0.004 
SEPARATED  0.082  0.45 0.004 0.075  0.42 0.004 0.102  0.56 0.005 0.104  0.55 0.005 
NEVER  MARRIED 0.052  0.76 0.002 0.056  0.83 0.003 0.071  1.02 0.003 0.069  0.99 0.003 
Employment Status                     
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.038  0.40 0.002 0.062  0.69 0.003 0.055  0.59 0.002 0.048  0.50 0.002 
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.015  -0.16 -0.001 -0.010  -0.11 0.000  -0.024  -0.25 -0.001 -0.018  -0.19 -0.001 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.071  -0.77 -0.003 -0.063  -0.69 -0.003 -0.054  -0.58 -0.002 -0.058  -0.61 -0.002 
AT  HOME  -0.160  -1.62 -0.006 -0.141  -1.48 -0.006 -0.144  -1.49 -0.006 -0.158  -1.57 -0.006 
STUDENT  0.002  0.02 0.000 0.024  0.23 0.001 0.007  0.07 0.000 0.000  0.00 0.000 
RETIRED  -0.209*  -1.90 -0.007 -0.203*  -1.87 -0.007 -0.204*  -1.86 -0.007 -0.199*  -1.76 -0.007 
OTHER  0.224  1.42 0.012 0.222  1.42 0.012 0.229  1.46 0.012 0.252  1.56 0.013 
Region                     
WESTERN  EUROPE    0.119**  2.32 0.005 0.087*  1.71 0.004 0.057  1.12 0.002 0.110** 2.07 0.004 
Pseudo R2  0.063       0.053       0.053       0.070      
Number of observations  18862       18887       18877       18155      
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The 
symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.  
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Table 5: 2SLS Focusing on Environmental Membership 
 
 WEIGHTED 2SLS  2SLS   (17)  FIRST 
STAGE 
REGRESSION 
   2SLS   (18)  FIRST 
STAGE 
REGRESSION 




   Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat. Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat. t-Stat.  Coeff. 
Environmental 
Motivation (m) 
                    
WILLINGNESS TO 
GIVE INCOME 
0.353*** 3.61                  
WILLINGNESS TO 
INCREASE TAXES 
       0.232*** 4.65          
CONTRIBUTE AT NO 
COSTS 
             -0.267*** -4.29   
Gender                      
FEMALE    -0.019**  -2.09  0.075*** 6.20 -0.005  -1.07  0.059*** 4.92 0.001  0.16  -0.025** -2.07 
Age                      
AGE  30-39  0.014*  1.78  -0.028 -1.51  0.010  1.53  -0.023 -1.23  0.016**  2.28  0.043**  2.17 
AGE 40-49  0.032***  3.28  -0.060***  -2.98  0.013**  1.97  -0.011  -0.55  0.017**  2.33  0.019  0.89 
AGE 50-59  0.048***  4.48  -0.065***  -2.95  0.031***  4.20  -0.029  -1.34  0.041***  4.89  0.055**  2.42 
AGE 60-69  0.044***  3.49  -0.060**  -2.17  0.030***  3.26  -0.035  -1.28  0.054***  4.58  0.119***  4.34 
AGE 70+  0.073***  3.86  -0.148***  -4.51  0.034***  3.12  -0.059*  -1.83  0.049***  3.85  0.109***  3.34 
Parental Effect                      
CHILD -0.008  -0.89  -0.002  -0.11  -0.014*  -1.92  0.018  0.86  -0.023***  -2.90  -0.050**  -2.34 
Formal and Informal 
Educ. 
                    
EDUCATION  -0.002 -1.40  0.017*** 15.84  0.000  -0.39  0.017*** 15.26  -0.001  -0.99  -0.018***  -15.62 
POLITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
-0.033**  -2.27  0.143*** 15.91  -0.013* -1.76  0.131*** 14.66  -0.022**  -2.24  -0.148***  -16.42 
Marital Status                      
WIDOWED  0.024* 1.77 -0.093*** -3.92 0.004  0.47  -0.065*** -2.79 0.001  0.17  0.043*  1.89 
DIVORCED  0.024**  2.03 -0.079*** -3.50 0.013  1.61  -0.073*** -3.27 0.013  1.49  0.064***  2.92 
SEPARATED  -0.004 -0.19  0.020  0.48 0.007  0.45  -0.014  -0.32 0.022  1.33  0.069  1.62 
NEVER  MARRIED  0.025***  3.25  -0.029* -1.65  0.022***  3.61  -0.032* -1.89  0.021***  3.27  0.021  1.16   31
Employment Status                      
PART TIME 
EMPLOYEE 
0.009  0.89  0.030 1.34  0.016*  1.96  0.019 0.87  0.014  1.62  -0.024  -1.03 
SELFEMPLOYED -0.013  -1.13 0.071***  3.10  0.001  0.09 0.045*  1.93  -0.006  -0.59  -0.062**  -2.52 
UNEMPLOYED  0.013  1.11 -0.074*** -3.24 0.002  0.27  -0.065*** -2.89 0.016  1.59  0.105***  4.67 
AT HOME  -0.009  -1.00  -0.001  -0.04  -0.001  -0.20  -0.038*  -1.75  0.016*  1.69  0.096***  4.32 
STUDENT -0.040***  -2.85  0.082***  2.97  -0.015  -1.55  0.032  1.15  -0.034***  -2.92  -0.092***  -3.16 
RETIRED  0.021  1.48 -0.114*** -4.86 0.005  0.66  -0.105*** -4.71 0.025** 2.05  0.163***  7.54 
OTHER 0.022  1.21  -0.004  -0.08  0.016  1.00  0.037  0.86  0.012  0.73  -0.049  -1.11 
Region                      
WESTERN  EUROPE    0.111***  6.25 -0.177*** -15.69  0.073***  11.40  -0.106*** -9.42 -0.024  -1.37  -0.271*** -23.66 




    -0.009*** -4.06     -0.014*** -6.20     0.012*** 5.30 
Test of excluded 
instruments 
    16.45***       38.50       28.10***  
Anderson canon. cor. 
LR statistic 
21.552***      47.697***      32.857***      
Anderson-Rubin test  43.86***           41.73***           40.040***          
Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** 
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Table 6: The Impact of Environmental Motivation on Membership Participation in Single Countries  
 96 REGRESSIONS 
  
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
 WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME   WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES   CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS  VARIABLE:  
 (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS) 
COUNTRIES                      
Western European 
Countries 
                  
Germany    0.586*** 4.47 0.012  0.365*** 3.24  0.011  -0.244** -2.47  -0.008 
Austria    0.299*** 4.51 0.041  0.193*** 3.29  0.028  -0.175***  -3.03  -0.025 
Belgium   0.263***  5.36  0.046  0.159*** 3.33  0.029  -0.241*** -5.05  -0.042 
Great Britain   1.119***  3.51  0.001  0.887***  4.51  0.003  -0.030  -0.14  -0.001 
Denmark    0.207*** 3.12 0.041  0.224*** 3.63  0.044  -0.234***  -3.56  -0.046 
Finland   0.402*** 3.60 0.027  0.259**  2.44  0.021  -0.187*  -1.90  -0.016 
France   0.269***  3.02  0.008  0.141*  1.74  0.005  -0.017  -0.20  -0.001 
Iceland    0.161 1.29  0.013  0.291**  2.25  0.022 -0.077  -0.65  -0.006 
Ireland    0.316*  1.88  0.007  0.102 0.79  0.002 -0.116  -1.02  -0.003 
Italy    0.422*** 4.15 0.022  0.273*** 3.64  0.017  -0.267***  -3.89  -0.016 
Luxembourg 0.211***  3.06  0.035  0.137**  2.11  0.023  -0.116*  -1.88  -0.019 
Malta    0.060  0.56  0.003 -0.078 0.66 -0.004 -0.023 -0.20  -0.001 
Netherlands  0.240*** 4.03 0.095  0.232*** 4.06  0.091  -0.227***  -3.34  -0.089 
North  Ireland  0.538*** 2.65 0.021  0.692*** 3.17  0.018  -0.075  -0.50  -0.004 
Portugal  2.473***  4.22  0.000  0.095 0.39  0.000 0.148 0.72  0.000 
Spain  0.481*** 3.77 0.010  0.237** 2.14  0.006  -0.306**  -2.38  -0.007 
Sweden  0.237***  2.73  0.040  0.074 0.98  0.013 -0.133*  -1.86  -0.022 
Eastern European 
Countries 
                  
Belarus  0.229 1.39  0.005  0.335***  2.38  0.007 -0.109  -0.84  -0.003   33
Bulgaria  0.633*** 3.86 0.009 0.437***  2.83 0.008  -0.190 -1.34  -0.005 
Croatia  0.146 1.10  0.004  -0.006  -0.03  0.000 -0.122  -0.91  -0.004 
Czech Republic  0.234***  2.79 0.028  0.141**  2.07 0.017  -0.107* -1.66  -0.013 
Estonia 0.608***  3.89  0.015  0.312*  1.78  0.011  -0.216  -1.65  -0.008 
Greece 0.309***  3.94  0.049 0.225***  3.35 0.037  -0.044 -0.70  -0.007 
Hungary  0.435*** 3.17 0.010  0.360*** 2.98  0.011  -0.274***  -3.28  -0.010 
Latvia  0.312*  1.74 0.001  0.427*** 2.65  0.010  -0.502** -1.97 -0.010 
Lithuania  1.078*** 4.08 0.002  0.520*** 3.13  0.007  -0.254  -1.21  -0.003 
Poland  0.312** 2.15  0.004  0.362** 2.06  0.004  -0.048  -0.39  -0.001 
Romania  -0.116  -0.82  -0.003  0.032 0.21  0.001 0.216 1.37  0.010 
Russia  0.422***  3.99  0.005  0.135 0.91  0.002 0.307**  2.34  0.004 
Slovak Republic   0.365***  3.57  0.015  0.347***  3.95  0.016  -0.173**  -2.22  -0.009 
Slovenia  0.152 0.90  0.010  0.021 0.16  0.001 0.111 1.21  0.007 
Ukraine  0.120 0.62  0.001  0.386**  2.08  0.002 -0.167  -1.16  -0.001 
Notes: Only the attitudinal coefficient is reported in the Table. Regressions without the economic situation. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 












Table 7: The Impact of Environmental Motivation on Unpaid Work in Single Countries  
 96 REGRESSIONS 
  
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT 
ESTIMATIONS 
 WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME   WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES   CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS  VARIABLE:  
 (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS)  (32 REGRESSIONS) 
COUNTRIES                      
Western European 
Countries 
                  
Germany    0.650*** 3.40 0.004  0.607*** 4.14  0.005 -0.330** -2.13 -0.005 
Austria   0.164*  1.71  0.007  0.044  0.52  0.002  -0.117  -1.56  -0.006 
Belgium    0.107*  1.68  0.006  0.073 1.13  0.004  0.006 0.08  0.000 
Great Britain   0.229**  2.11  0.024  0.110  1.04  0.012  -0.171*  -1.68  -0.017 
Denmark    0.193 1.61  0.007  0.058 0.60  0.002  -0.181  -1.52  -0.007 
Finland    0.198 1.07  0.007  0.254 1.40  0.007  -0.156  -1.27  -0.005 
France   0.226**  2.03  0.003  0.150  1.30  0.002  -0.085  -0.79  -0.001 
Iceland    0.339 1.35  0.009  0.328 1.56  0.009  0.019 0.12  0.001 
Ireland    -0.132 -0.65  0.000 -0.038 -0.21  0.000  0.154  0.77  0.000 
Italy    0.410*** 3.16 0.013  0.270*** 2.90  0.009 -0.352***  -3.94 -0.012 
Luxembourg 0.211**  2.10  0.016  0.099  1.01  0.008  -0.106  -1.18  -0.008 
Malta   0.193  1.22  0.011  -0.053  -0.37  -0.003  -0.014  -0.11  -0.001 
Netherlands  0.117 0.90  0.007  0.240*  1.84  0.013  0.154 1.06  0.009 
North Ireland  1.513**  2.34  0.000  0.576***  3.15  0.001  -0.263  -0.80  0.000 
Portugal  9.210 1.28  0.000  -0.382  -1.30  0.000  0.032 0.12  0.000 
Spain  1.141*** 3.76 0.001  0.391*** 3.01  0.004 -0.406** -2.40 -0.004 
Sweden 0.346**  2.13  0.013  0.178  1.37  0.007  -0.151  -1.60  -0.006   35
Eastern European 
Countries 
                
Belarus  0.118 1.27  0.003  0.060 0.63  0.001  0.178**  2.04  0.005 
Bulgaria 0.479***  3.50  0.007  0.277**  2.01  0.005  -0.174  -1.25  -0.003 
Croatia 0.167  1.15  0.003  -0.063  -0.31  -0.001  -0.039  -0.26  -0.001 
Czech Republic  0.130  1.39  0.008 0.156* 1.72 0.009  -0.162*  -1.77 -0.009 
Estonia 0.746***  3.99  0.000  0.249  1.10  0.000  -0.288  -1.60  0.000 
Greece 0.226***  2.72  0.035 0.111  1.64 0.018  0.049 0.74  0.008 
Hungary 0.362***  3.42  0.011  0.211*  1.86  0.008  -0.137  -1.46  -0.005 
Latvia  0.009 0.06  0.000  0.008 0.07  0.000  0.226 0.23  0.001 
Lithuania  0.886*** 3.87 0.003  0.741*** 3.55  0.006 0.009  0.03 0.000 
Poland 1.010***  3.48  0.000  0.028  0.13  0.000  -0.367**  -2.40  0.000 
Romania  -0.127  -0.73  -0.001  0.076 0.50  0.001  0.318 1.12  0.003 
Russia  0.337*** 2.80 0.003  0.309*  1.85  0.004 0.189  1.19 0.003 
Slovak Republic   0.358***  2.63  0.013  0.341***  3.08  0.013  -0.197**  -2.29  -0.009 
Slovenia  0.126 0.71  0.008  0.016 0.12  0.001  0.007 0.07  0.070 
Ukraine 0.175  0.62  0.000  0.586***  2.84  0.000  -1.183***  -4.74  0.000 
Notes: Only the attitudinal coefficient is reported in the Table. Regressions without the economic situation. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper investigates whether environmental motivation affects environmental 
behavior. We therefore present first of a model that explores the relationship between 
environmental motivation and volunteering. In next step we test the hypothesis generated 
in the theoretical empirically. Behavioral engagement has been proxied through the 
participation in environmental organizations focusing on two aspects, namely being a 
member and doing unpaid work for environmental organizations. We also use three 
different proxies for environmental motivation, two of which measure pro-environmental 
attitudes, namely the willingness to give part of the own income to prevent environmental 
pollution, and to agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is use to prevent 
environmental pollution. In addition, we have explored a variable that measures people’s 
incentive to free-ride (profit without incurring costs). The motivation behind such a study 
is the observation that deterrence models fail to predict the relatively high level of 
compliance in various situations, ranging from tax compliance, over contributing to 
provide a public good, to not littering despite the low probability of getting caught and 
penalized. This paper provides support for the idea that environmental motivation indeed 
affects individuals’ voluntary involvement in environmental organizations by using a 
large micro-data set covering not less than 32 different countries providing also a 
summary for every single country (almost 200 regressions). In addition, we have 
explored potential endogeneity problems. The results show robust findings and therefore 
indicate that attitudinal questions help to explain behavioral consequences. 
Environmental motivation, environmental morale or pro-environmental attitudes are   37
highly relevant in understanding why people have a higher willingness to be involved in 
environmental protection. However, it should be noted that these social norms work 
stronger towards being a member rather than doing unpaid work in environmental 
organizations. Unpaid work is associated with higher opportunity costs which may help 
to explain such a difference. Finally, it should be noted that further investigations are 
required to gain a better understanding of what shapes individuals’ environmental 
motivation. This would provide a better foundation to derive policy implications to 






   38
 
Table A1 
Description of control variables 
Variable 
Derivation 
Age  AGE 30-39, AGE40-49, AGE 50-59, AGE 60-69, AGE +70 (AGE -30 in the 
reference group,) 
Gender  WOMAN (MAN in the reference group) 
Parent Effect  CHILD (not having children in the reference group) 
EDUCATION:  
What is the highest educational level that you have attained?  
1.  No formal education 
2.  Incomplete primary school 
3.  Completed primary school  
4.  Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5.  Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
6.  Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7.  Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 
8.  Some university-level education, without degree 
9.  University-level education, with degree 
 
Formal and Informal 
Education 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION:  
When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political 
matters? 
1.   Never   
2.   Occasionally 
3.   Frequently 
Marital Status  WIDOWED; DIVORCED; SEPARATED; NEVER MARRIED (MARRIED in 
the reference group) 
Economic Situation  People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the 
middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as 
belonging to the: 
UPPER CLASS, MIDDLE CLASS (the rest, WORKING CLASS and LOWER 
CLASS, in the reference group). 
Employment Status  PART-TIME EMPLOYEE, SELFEMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, AT HOME, 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Key  variables         
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES (INCOME)  38877  1.620  0.885  0  3 
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTIDUES (TAXES)  38834  1.412  0.877  0  3 
ENVIRONMENTAL  FREE-RIDING  39038  1.996 0.894 0  3 
MEMBER VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL  ORGANIZATION  41125  0.049 0.216 0  1 
WORKING VOLUNTARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL  ORGANIZATION  41125  0.020 0.140 0  1 
         
Control Variables         
AGE 30-39  40963  0.197 0.398 0  1 
AGE 40-49  40963  0.191 0.393 0  1 
AGE 50-59  40963 0.15  0.357  0  1 
AGE 60-69  40963  0.135 0.342 0  1 
AGE 70+  40963  0.102 0.302 0  1 
WOMAN  41114 0.54  0.498  0  1 
CHILDREN  41125  0.077 0.266 0  1 
EDUCATION 39840  18.712  5.125  5  74 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  40713  1.886 0.654 1  3 
UPPER  CLASS  21335  0.136 0.343 0  1 
MIDDLE  CLASS  21335  0.338 0.473 0  1 
WIDOWED  39861  0.097 0.295 0  1 
DIVORCED  39861 0.07  0.256  0  1 
SEPARATED  39861  0.016 0.124 0  1 
NEVER MARRIED  39861 0.228  0.42  0  1 
PART TIME EMPLOYED  40919  0.068 0.252 0  1 
SELFEMPLOYED  40919  0.052 0.222 0  1 
UNEMPLOYED  40919 0.229  0.42  0  1 
AT HOME  40919  0.095 0.293 0  1 
STUDENT  40919 0.061  0.24  0  1 
RETIRED  40919  0.073 0.261 0  1 
OTHER  40919  0.018 0.131 0  1 
         
Instrument         
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